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1 Introduction
Toil in the field of quantum computation promises a bountiful harvest, both to the
pragmatic-minded researcher seeking to develop new and efficient solutions to practi-
cal problems of immediate and transparent significance, as well as to those of us moved
more by philosophical concerns: we who toil in the mud and black earth, ever desirous
of those remote and yet more profound insights at the root of scientific inquiry. Some of
us have seen in quantum computation the promise of a solution to the interpretational
debates which have characterised the foundations and philosophy of quantum mechanics
since its inception. Some of us have seen the prospects for a deeper understanding of the
nature of computation as such. Others have seen quantum computation as potentially
illuminating our understanding of the nature and capacities of the human mind.1
An arguably more modest position (see, e.g., Aaronson, 2013; Timpson, 2013) regard-
ing the philosophical interest of quantum computation (and related fields like quantum
information), is that its study contributes to our understanding of the foundations of
quantum mechanics and computer science mainly by offering us different perspectives on
old foundational questions—fresh opportunities, that is, to reconsider just what we mean
in asking these questions. One of my goals in this paper is to provide such a different
perspective, on the Bell inequalities in particular. Specifically I will be arguing that the
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1For an example of a claim to the effect that quantum computation is capable of informing interpreta-
tional debates in quantum mechanics, see Deutsch (1997), and for further discussion of this, see Wallace
(2012). Discussions of the relevance of quantum computation to mathematics and computer science can
be found in Deutsch et al. (2000), Hagar (2007), Aaronson (2013), and Timpson (2013). For claims of
relevance to the philosophy of mind, see, e.g., Hameroff (1998).
significance we attach to Bell’s and related inequalities is in part informed by the con-
text of discussion. It is informed, that is, by a number of what I will call ‘plausibility
constraints’ associated with a given context, whose role is to rule out certain ‘loopholes’
to the inequalities in that context. Consequently, the kind of local hidden variables de-
scriptions that we deem plausible in the context of a discussion of the sorts of systems
buildable by us, is importantly different from what we deem plausible in the context of
a discussion of the natural world as it exists apart from us. And yet in both cases there
is still an important sense in which the Bell inequalities should be taken as answering
the same question: the question, that is, concerning the boundary between classical and
quantum description.
This is my first goal. My ultimate goal, however (which is informed by the first), is to
clarify a narrower issue. Specifically it is to clarify the discussion surrounding the claim
that the presence of a quantum system in a pure entangled state is sufficient to allow a
quantum computer to realise a computational advantage (or ‘quantum speedup’) over a
classical computer.2 Call this claim the “sufficiency of entanglement thesis.” In the liter-
ature on quantum computation, one often encounters the statement that the sufficiency
of entanglement thesis is false. Motivating those who would deny the sufficiency of en-
tanglement thesis is the Gottesman-Knill theorem (Gottesman, 1999). According to this
theorem, any quantum algorithm which exclusively utilises the elements of a particular
restricted set of quantum operations can be re-expressed using an alternative (i.e., the
‘stabiliser’) formalism which shows us how that algorithm can be efficiently simulated
by classical means. Since some of the algorithms which exclusively utilise operations
from this set involve the generation of pure entangled states, it seems that entanglement
cannot therefore be sufficient to enable one to achieve a quantum speedup. Thus, Datta
et al., for instance, write: “the Gottesman-Knill theorem ... demonstrates that global en-
tanglement is far from sufficient for exponential speedup.” (2005, 1). Nielsen & Chuang
likewise write:
Consider that interesting quantum information processing tasks ... can there-
fore be efficiently simulated on a classical computer, by the Gottesman-Knill
theorem. Moreover, we will see shortly that a wide variety of quantum error-
correcting codes can be described within the stabilizer formalism. There is
much more to quantum computation than just the power bestowed by quan-
tum entanglement! (2000, 464).
We will examine a more detailed and explicit statement of this position by Jozsa &
Linden (2003) in §3. For now let me simply say that, in the quotations cited above, it is
not immediately obvious exactly what is meant when it is said that entanglement is “far
from sufficient” for speedup, or that “there is much more to quantum computation” than
entanglement. Part of my goal here, therefore, is to distinguish and clarify the different
senses in which such statements can be taken. There is of course one sense in which
the Gottesman-Knill theorem shows, conclusively, that the sufficiency of entanglement
thesis is false: clearly, the mere presence of a pure entangled state is insufficient to realise
2I will be focusing exclusively on the computational capabilities associated with pure states in this
paper. A system in a mixed entangled state can be thought of as being in the presence of ‘noise’, strong
enough, in some cases, to prevent the system from being capable of realising more than a very small
speedup (see Linden & Popescu, 2001). Our concern, however, is mainly with the issue of whether even
an entangled system not in the presence of any noise whatsoever (i.e., a pure state) is sufficient to enable
speedup. I discuss this issue again in n. 28 below.
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a quantum computational speedup. However the sufficiency of entanglement thesis can
also be taken in a second, more interesting sense. One might take the thesis, that is, as
claiming that quantum entanglement, by itself, is sufficient to enable, or make possible,
quantum computational speedup; i.e., that no other physical resources are needed to make
quantum speedup possible if one begins with a system in a pure entangled state. This
claim, or so I will argue, is not proved false by the Gottesman-Knill theorem. What
the Gottesman-Knill theorem shows us, rather, is only that if we limit ourselves to the
Gottesman-Knill operations, we will not have used the entanglement with which we have
been provided to its full potential. For the Gottesman-Knill operations, I will argue,
are just those operations whose associated statistics (even when they involve entangled
states) are reproducible in a local hidden variables theory that we would grant as plausible
in the computational context. Indeed we do not need the Gottesman-Knill theorem to tell
us this, for as I will argue, it is already evident when we consider the Bell inequalities.3
The paper will go as follows: I will introduce the Gottesman-Knill theorem and moti-
vate the assertion that the sufficiency of entanglement thesis is in some sense false in §2.
Then in §3 I will begin by considering a detailed and explicit version of this assertion due
to Jozsa & Linden (2003). In the remainder of §3 I will try to clarify what I take to be
the real lesson of the Gottesman-Knill theorem: that—and this is in an important sense
nothing new—there are some statistics associated with entangled states which admit of
a local hidden variables description.4 In §4 I will argue that we should consider these
descriptions to be plausible in the context of a discussion of classical and quantum com-
putation. Finally in §5 I will consider the consequences of this for our understanding of
the sufficiency of entanglement thesis. I will argue that if one intends by the claim that
entanglement is sufficient to enable quantum speedup, that no further physical resources
are required (the claim denied by Jozsa & Linden), then this claim is not shown false by
the Gottesman-Knill theorem.
2 The Gottesman-Knill theorem
Call an operator A a stabiliser of the state |ψ〉 if:5
A|ψ〉 = |ψ〉. (2.1)
3If this is correct, then why do I not say that the sufficiency of entanglement thesis is true, rather
than merely that it is not proved false? Explaining quantum speedup involves more than showing why a
classical computer is incapable of efficiently simulating the evolution of a quantum computer. It involves,
in addition, showing why a classical computer cannot, by whatever means, solve a particular problem
efficiently which happens to be in the complexity class BQP (the “bounded error quantum polynomial
time” class). These two questions are obviously related, and it is not at all implausible to think that the
explanation will be the same in both cases. However this is by no means automatic.
4I say that the Gottesman-Knill theorem tells us nothing new. While this is true in an important
sense, I should not be taken here as denying that the theorem is of value. Despite the fact that in one
sense it is, as we will see, no more than a corollary of Bell’s theorem, it is nevertheless a profoundly
illuminating result in that it encourages us to look at Bell’s and other inequalities with fresh eyes and
in different contexts.
5In the following exegesis of the Gottesman-Knill theorem I have drawn substantially from Gottesman
(1999) and from Nielsen & Chuang (2000).
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For instance, consider the Bell state of two qubits:6
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉).
For this state we have
(X ⊗X)|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |0〉 ⊗ |0〉)
=
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉) = |Φ+〉,
(Z ⊗ Z)|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ (−|1〉 ⊗ −|1〉)
=
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉) = |Φ+〉.
X ⊗ X and Z ⊗ Z are thus both stabilisers of the state |Φ+〉. Here, X and Z are the
Pauli operators:
X ≡
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z ≡
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
The remaining Pauli operators, I (the identity operator) and Y , are defined as:
I ≡
(
1 0
0 1
)
, Y ≡
(
0 −i
i 0
)
.
The set Pn of n-fold tensor products of Pauli operators (plus those multiplied by α ∈
{±1,±i}) forms a group of operators, called a Pauli Group, which is closed under matrix
multiplication. For example, for n = 2: P2 ≡ {αI ⊗ I, αI ⊗X, αI ⊗ Y , αI ⊗Z, αX ⊗ I,
αX ⊗X, αX ⊗ Y , ...}.7
Call the set VS of states that are stabilised by every element in S, where S is some
group of operators closed under matrix multiplication, the vector space stabilised by S.
Consider a state |ψ〉 ∈ VS. For any s ∈ S and any unitary operation U , we have
U |ψ〉 = Us|ψ〉 = UsU †U |ψ〉, (2.2)
where the last equality follows from the definition of a unitary operator. Thus UsU † sta-
bilises U |ψ〉 and the vector space UVS is stabilised by the group USU † ≡ {UsU †|s ∈ S}.
Consider, for instance, the state |0〉, stabilised by the Z operator. To determine the sta-
biliser of this state after it has been subjected to the (unitary) Hadamard8 transformation
H|0〉 = |+〉 we simply compute HZH†. Thus the stabiliser of |+〉 is X.
Now let s1, ..., sm be elements of S. s1, ..., sm are said to generate the group S if every
element of S can be written as a product of elements from s1, ..., sm. For instance, the
6A qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, analogous to a classical bit. It can be physically
realised by any two-level quantum mechanical system.
7The Pauli operators I, X, Y , Z are rare in that they are both unitary and Hermitian operators (it
is because of the latter, of course, that they are also called the Pauli observables). When we generalise
these operators to allow multiples α = {±1,±i}, however, this is sometimes no longer the case. For
example, the operators iX and −iX, though unitary, are not Hermitian (they are anti-Hermitian).
8The H or Hadamard operator takes |0〉 to (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 ≡ |+〉 and |1〉 to (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 ≡ |−〉.
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reader can verify that the subgroup, A, of P3, defined by A ≡ {I ⊗ I ⊗ I, Z ⊗ Z ⊗ I, I ⊗
Z ⊗Z,Z ⊗ I ⊗Z} can be generated by the elements {Z ⊗Z ⊗ I, I ⊗Z ⊗Z} (Nielsen &
Chuang, 2000, §10.5.1). We may thus alternately express A in terms of its generators as
follows: A = 〈Z ⊗ Z ⊗ I, I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z〉.
In order to compute the action of a unitary operator on a group S it suffices to
compute the action of the unitary operator on the generators of S. For instance, |0〉⊗n is
the unique state stabilised by 〈Z1, Z2, ..., Zn〉 (where the latter expression is a shorthand
form of 〈Z ⊗ I⊗n−1, I ⊗ Z ⊗ I⊗n−2, ..., I⊗n−1 ⊗ Z〉). Consequently, the stabiliser of the
state H⊗n|0〉⊗n is 〈X1, X2, ..., Xn〉. Note that this state, expressed in the standard state
vector formalism:9
H⊗n|0〉⊗n = 1
2n/2
(|0〉+ |1〉)1(|0〉+ |1〉)2 . . . (|0〉+ |1〉)n (2.3)
=
1
2n/2
(|00 . . . 00〉+ |00 . . . 01〉+ · · ·+ |11 . . . 10〉+ |11 . . . 11〉, (2.4)
specifies 2n different amplitudes. Contrast this with the stabiliser description of the state
in terms of its generators 〈X1, X2, ..., Xn〉, which is linear in n and thus capable of an
efficient classical representation.10
Using the stabiliser formalism, it can be shown that all, as well as all combinations,
of the following operations are capable of an efficient classical representation. (i) The
Clifford group of gates; i.e., those unitary transformations which map elements of the
Pauli group to other elements of the Pauli group.11 These are the Pauli (I, X, Y ,
Z) gates, the Hadamard gate, the Phase gate (a pi/2 rotation of the Bloch sphere12
about the zˆ-axis), and the controlled not (“CNOT”) gate.13,14 (ii) Clifford group gates
conditioned on classical bits (indicating, e.g., the results of previous measurements).
(iii) State preparation in the computational (i.e., {|0〉, |1〉}) basis. (iv) Measurements
of observables in the Pauli group. This is the content of the Gottesman-Knill theorem
(Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §10.5.4).
What is especially notable about this theorem from the point of view of our discussion
is that some of the states which may be realised through the operations in this set are
actually entangled states. In particular, by combining a Hadamard and a CNOT gate,
9Note that from now on |αβ〉 and |α〉|β〉 should be understood as shorthand forms of |α〉 ⊗ |β〉.
Additionally: |α〉1 ⊗ |α〉2 ⊗ ...⊗ |α〉n ≡ |αn〉 ≡ |α〉n ≡ |α〉⊗n.
10A basic distinction, in computational complexity theory, is between those computational problems
that are amenable to an efficient solution in terms of time and/or space resources, and those that are
not. Easy (or ‘tractable’, ‘feasible’, ‘efficiently solvable’, etc.) problems are those for which solutions
exist which involve resources bounded by a polynomial in the input size, n. Hard problems are those
which are not easy, i.e., they are those whose solution requires resources that are ‘exponential’ in n,
i.e., that grow faster than any polynomial in n (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 139). Note that the term
‘exponential’ is being used rather loosely here. Functions such as nlogn are called ‘exponential’ but do
not grow as fast as a true exponential such as 2n.
11A quantum ‘gate’ is just a unitary transformation. In a quantum computational circuit it plays a
role analogous to a (reversible) logic gate in a classical circuit.
12The Bloch sphere is a geometrical representation of the state space of a single qubit. States on the
surface of the sphere represent pure states, while those in the interior represent mixed states (see Nielsen
& Chuang, 2000).
13The CNOT or controlled-not gate takes two qubits |s〉|t〉 to |s〉|t⊕ s〉, where |s〉 is the control, |t〉 the
target qubit, and ⊕ is addition modulo 2 (i.e., ‘exclusive-or’). Intuitively, the control qubit determines
whether or not to apply a bit-flip operation (i.e., a NOT or X operation) to the target qubit.
14Note that the Hadamard, Phase, and CNOT gates by themselves suffice to generate the Clifford
Group.
5
one can generate any one of the Bell states (which one is generated depends on the value
assigned to the input qubits); i.e.,
|0〉|0〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|0〉√
2
CNOT−−−→ |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉√
2
= |Φ+〉, (2.5)
|0〉|1〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|1〉√
2
CNOT−−−→ |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉√
2
= |Ψ+〉, (2.6)
|1〉|0〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|0〉 − |1〉|0〉√
2
CNOT−−−→ |0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉√
2
= |Φ−〉, (2.7)
|1〉|1〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|1〉 − |1〉|1〉√
2
CNOT−−−→ |0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉√
2
= |Ψ−〉. (2.8)
In fact many quantum algorithms utilise just such a combination of gates (e.g., teleporta-
tion; see Nielsen & Chuang 2000, §1.3.7). Now recall that the sufficiency of entanglement
thesis is the claim that the presence of a quantum system in a pure entangled state is
sufficient to allow a quantum computer to realise quantum speedup. If all of the opera-
tions from this set are efficiently classically simulable, however, then it appears as though
the sufficiency of entanglement thesis must be false (at least in some sense), for evidently
there are quantum algorithms utilising pure entangled states that are efficiently simulable
classically.15
3 The significance of the Gottesman-Knill theorem
Reflecting on this circumstance in their influential (2003) article (in a section entitled: Is
entanglement a key resource for computational power? ), Jozsa & Linden write:
Recall that the significance of entanglement for pure-state computations is
derived from the fact that unentangled pure states ... of n qubits have a de-
scription involving poly(n) parameters (in contrast to O(2n) parameters for a
general pure state). But this special property of unentangled states (of hav-
ing a ‘small’ descriptions [sic.]) is contingent on a particular mathematical
description, as amplitudes in the computational basis. If we were to adopt
some other choice of mathematical description for quantum states (and their
evolution), then, although it will be mathematically equivalent to the ampli-
tude description, there will be a different class of states which will now have
a polynomially sized description; i.e. two formulations of a theory which are
mathematically equivalent (and hence equally logically valid) need not have
their corresponding mathematical descriptions of elements of the theory being
[sic.] interconvertible by a polynomially bounded computation. With this in
mind we see that the significance of entanglement as a resource for quantum
computation is not an intrinsic property of quantum physics itself, but is tied
to a particular additional (arbitrary) choice of mathematical formalism for
15It is worth noting that Steane (2003, 473) uses the Gottesman-Knill theorem as the basis for an
objection to the many worlds explanation of quantum computation (the many worlds explanation seems,
at least at first blush, to depend crucially on the fact that quantum algorithms are expressible in the
state vector formalism). His own view is that it is entanglement which explains quantum speedup. It
should be clear, however, that the Gottesman-Knill theorem is just as much a prima facie problem (if
not more so) for Steane’s view as it is for many worlds theorists.
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the theory. ... An explicit example of an alternative formalism and its im-
plications for the power of quantum computation is provided by the so-called
stabilizer formalism and the Gottesman-Knill theorem ... Thus, in a funda-
mental sense, the power of quantum computation over classical computation
ought to be derived simultaneously from all possible classical mathematical
formalisms for representing quantum theory, not any single such formalism
and associated quality (such as entanglement), ... (2029-2030 Jozsa & Linden,
2003, emphasis in original).
That two equivalent mathematical representations of the same physical object can
have ineliminably vastly differently sized descriptions depending only on the formalism
used is a profoundly counter-intuitive notion. This is not to say that it cannot be correct,
of course. But rather than trying to make sense of this notion, let us consider whether
some other more satisfying explanation can be given. It is easy to see, first of all, that
even solely within the amplitude formalism, one and the same system can admit of either
a large or a small description. We have seen an example of this already. The state
that results from applying H⊗n to a system in the state |0〉⊗n can be described as a
superposition of 2n states, as in Eq. (2.4). It can also be described as a product of n
states, as in Eq. (2.3)—an exponentially smaller description. Indeed we can do much
better than this, and can make do with one of the even more compact expressions:
1
2n/2
(|0〉+ |1〉)n , 1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
|x〉. (3.1)
All of these descriptions are equivalent. In this case, however, there is no mystery as to
why. It is facts about the underlying systems being described which make these differently
sized descriptions possible. For instance, the fact that the properties of each individual
subsystem are maximally specifiable makes it possible to represent the superposition
(2.4) as the product state (2.3). And since in this particular case each subsystem is in an
identical state, we do not really need to single out any one of them, and thus we can use
one of the descriptions given in (3.1).
This is not true in general. It is a quantum mechanical fact that subsystems of en-
tangled systems are not maximally specifiable (i.e., their states are never pure). Thus
entangled quantum systems cannot be given a pure product state representation. De-
scriptions of entangled states and of the transitions to and from them cannot therefore
be compressed in the same way that (2.4) is compressible into (2.3). At least this is true
in the standard amplitude formalism. Strangely, if we move from the amplitude to the
stabiliser formalism it seems as though it is possible, somehow, to give more compact
descriptions of these states and their transitions, despite the quantum mechanical fact
just mentioned.
However let us persist, for a little while longer at least, in our conviction that it is facts
about the underlying system that is subjected to the Gottesman-Knill transformations,
and not facts about the formalism we use to describe it per se, which makes this possible.
If we persist in this, then we are led naturally to the conclusion that systems subjected
to just these transformations are somehow not using the entanglement available to them
effectively, that somehow the information that would be required to specify them if they
were using it effectively is not needed and can be omitted. This statement is still quite
vague. Let us see if we can explicate it more precisely.
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The Gottesman-Knill theorem tells us that a certain set of quantum operations can be
efficiently simulated with a classical computer (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, 464). Let us then
begin by explicating the notion of “classical computer simulation.” What does it mean to
provide a classical computer simulation of a quantum system? Perhaps most essentially,
it means that the computer doing the simulating can be given a classical description.
What, now, does this mean? Well for one, it means that a complete description of
the system, which in general can consist of many sub-components, is separable into
complete descriptions of those individual sub-components. Furthermore, it means that
our descriptions of the interactions between those sub-components are always constrained
by classical physical laws.16 For instance, the speed by which these interactions propagate
will be constrained by the speed of light. Importantly, the behaviour associated with
classical systems can always be described (in principle) in terms of causes and effects,
and correlations between effects can always be described in terms of common causes.
Thus a classical computer is called classical because it can be described as a classical
physical system. Its components, describable independently of one another, interact in a
locally causal, spatiotemporally continuous, manner. They can never be interpreted as
violating any of the laws and principles of special relativity or of classical mechanics. Nor
can the correlations between spatially distant parts of the machine ever be interpreted
as violating the Bell inequalities. This last statement is true no matter how large the
machine is, and no matter how far apart the different nodes of the computer (e.g., in a
distributed setting) are. All such correlations are always factorisable and they can always
in principle be described in terms of classical common causes; i.e., common causes that
are located within the prior light cone of these spatially distant locations.
Now imagine a quantum computer performing some series of Gottesman-Knill opera-
tions, and imagine a classical computer which efficiently simulates those operations. If I
were to now provide you with a specification of the classical computer—its source code,
for instance, or better: some hardware-level description—then in doing this I would be
providing you with an alternative classical, i.e. locally causal, description of what the
quantum computer is doing when it is performing those operations. In other words, I
would be providing you with a “local hidden variables theory,” so to speak, to reproduce
the quantum computer’s observable behaviour. This deserves emphasis: any classical
computer which we program to keep track of the stabiliser description of a quantum sys-
tem as it evolves through time is describable in a locally causal way. This is just what
it means for the computer to be classical. To describe the classical computer’s operation
as it simulates the quantum computer, therefore, is to provide a local hidden variables
theory for the latter.
Indeed, contrary to Jozsa & Linden, there is no need to refer to the stabiliser formalism
in order to show that one can describe the Gottesman-Knill operations in terms of such
local hidden variables theories. We can show this to be true by referring to the standard
amplitude formalism as well. This is evident if we consider the implications of the Bell
inequalities. Recall that the Gottesman-Knill operations consist specifically of the Clifford
group of transformations (possibly conditioned on classical bits) which map the Pauli
group into itself, measurements of observables in the Pauli group, and state preparation
in the computational basis. In Appendix A.1 it is shown (informally) that the combined
effect of any of these operations, for any subsystem of the system to which they are
applied, is equivalent to the measurement of one of the Pauli observables ±X, ±Y , ±Z
on an eigenstate of a Pauli observable. Now since the Pauli observables (disregarding the
16With Bohr, I take these to include the laws of special and general relativity.
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trivial transformation I) represent pi rotations of the Bloch sphere about the x, y, and z
axes, the respective orientations of different ends of an experimental apparatus set up to
conduct an experiment involving Pauli observables on a combined system will never differ
by anything other than an angle proportional to pi/2. These, however, are precisely the
orientations for which Bell showed it possible to provide a local hidden variables theory
to reproduce the statistics associated with the singlet state (Bell, 2004 [1964]). Bell’s
technique is straightforwardly extendable, moreover, to the other Bell states and to other
bipartite entangled combinations of eigenstates of Pauli operators (see Appendix A.1).17
Thus far we have considered only bipartite systems. Yet it is also possible to provide
local hidden variables descriptions of the statistics associated with Pauli measurements
on general n-partite systems, and for such cases things are more interesting. For instance,
in the tripartite GHZ (a.k.a. “cat”) state: (|000〉+ |111〉)/√2, it is well known that it is
impossible to assign noncontextual values to the x and y components of each particle’s
spin in a way that recovers the quantum mechanical predictions associated with (simulta-
neous) joint measurements of Pauli observables on the combined system (Mermin, 1990).
One can nevertheless produce a local hidden variables description of these measurement
statistics if the nodes of the classical computer one is describing are able to communicate
with one another during the process. The communication of only one classical bit, in
fact, is sufficient to recover the quantum mechanical predictions for any joint measure-
ment of Pauli observables on this tripartite state. To recover the quantum mechanical
predictions associated with Pauli measurements on n-partite GHZ states, and indeed on
any n-partite state which can be generated using only Gottesman-Knill operations, no
more than n− 2 bits are required (see: Tessier 2004; Tessier et al. 2005; the procedure is
also sketched in Appendix B).
It will be best to stop here for a moment, as the reader may, not without some
justification, feel uncomfortable at the prospect of including any form of communication
as part of a local hidden variables description. We have here two seemingly obvious and
yet prima facie incompatible claims. On the one hand it is clearly the case that a classical
computer is a classical physical system, whose parts interact with one another in a locally
causal, spatiotemporally continuous, way. Thus a description of a classical computer
simulation of a quantum system, even when it involves communication, is clearly a local
hidden variables description of the quantum system in some sense. On the other hand,
it is also true that the supposed nonlocal character of quantum systems is usually taken
to be demonstrated by the fact that certain quantum experiments seem to require some
form of influence (even if only benign) from one end of the apparatus to the other in
order to satisfy the Bell inequalities (see, e.g., Maudlin, 2011). There is a tension here
that needs to be resolved. Let us see if we can resolve it.18
17In fact, as we will discuss later, there is a yet simpler way (involving a small amount of classical
communication) to recover the statistics associated with these states (see Appendix A.2).
18Presumably this tension is part of the reason why Tessier does not go so far as to call his scheme
a local hidden variables description, but rather only a local hidden variables description that has been
augmented with classical communication. On Tessier’s interpretation of the scheme it is not really either
of these, however, for the imaginary terms in the scheme (see Appendix B) evidently interfere nonlocally
to preclude (in the absence of communication) an unambiguous assignment of spin components. The
classical communication subsequently employed to compensate is thus not best viewed as a supplement
to an otherwise local model but as a corrective to the nonlocal influences present in it. To turn the
scheme into a local hidden variables description, one must reinterpret it in a way similar to the way
depicted in Figure 1, to be discussed in the next section.
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Figure 1: Satisfying the Bell inequalities nonlocally (left) and locally (right).
4 Explicating the notion of a local hidden variables
theory
We can start to resolve the tension if we consider, first, just what it is that we are required
to reproduce. When a pair of spin-1/2 particles, a and b, are prepared in the singlet state
and then subsequently spatially separated, then when Alice makes, for instance, a Z
measurement on a, quantum mechanics tells us that the state of b changes instantaneously,
so that when Bob measures Z on b, his result will be perfectly anti-correlated with
Alice’s. These are the dynamics of quantum systems according to quantum mechanics.
Our challenge, however, is not to reproduce the dynamics of standard quantum theory.
Our task is to produce an alternative theory with the ability to reproduce the actually
observed statistics associated with such experiments.19
Now in order to actually observe the statistics associated with joint Pauli experiments
on two or more spatially separated systems, one must combine the results associated
with each of these sub-experiments. That is, someone must somehow gather together
the results registered locally by Alice and Bob, place them side by side, and examine
them in order to observe the joint outcome. There is no escaping this. Whether Alice
and Bob physically meet with one another to discuss the results over tea, or whether
they physically transmit their results to one another or to a neutral party via telephone,
or use some other physical means, it is absolutely necessary that the results be collated
together at some point, somehow, if the combined outcome of the experiment is to be
actually observed. During this process of collating the results, there is time for Alice
and Bob to send finite signals to one another (at a velocity no greater than that of
light) so as to coordinate the observed outcomes of their individual sub-measurements
and “correct” them if necessary. If we now take our measurement event to consist in
the act of actually observing the combined result, then all of this signalling activity will
have taken place in the past light cone of that measurement event (see Figure 1). It
can therefore be considered as part of the state preparation—the common cause—for
that measurement event. Thus if we produce a description of this sort which replicates
the statistics associated with a particular class of observables, we will have produced an
alternative local hidden variables theory for those observables.
19The local hidden variables account which I am about to describe is superficially different from,
but essentially quite similar to what Kent (2005) has called the “collapse locality loophole.” In Kent’s
loophole account, state reductions for Alice’s and Bob’s particles do not occur at spacelike but at timelike
separation, while the precise character of the state reduction for any one particular particle depends on
any previous state reductions within the past light cone of that particle. I am indebted to Wayne Myrvold
for drawing my attention to Kent’s account and to its similarity with the one sketched below.
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The tension I pointed out in the last section is still not completely resolved. Surely,
it will be objected, this is not what we normally think of when we think of a local hidden
variables theory. The device of delaying the evaluation of the combined measurement
result until the parties have found time to meet together over crumpets and tea is blatantly
ad hoc. It is also extremely conspiratorial—quite comically so. Yes, it most certainly is
both, but this is no fault in this context.
Bell’s and related inequalities are best thought of, not as ‘no-go’ theorems per se, but
rather as specifying constraints. They tell us what a local hidden variables theory which
gives rise to a joint probability distribution must be like; i.e., what general properties it
must satisfy. In and of themselves, however, Bell’s and related inequalities are little more
than formal statements. Bell’s (2004 [1964]) original inequality, for instance, is essentially
little more than a theorem of probability (see Bell, 2004 [1981]).20 This is no fault. It is
precisely this, in fact, which gives it and similar inequalities their power and generality.
Nevertheless, if we are to make a meaningful distinction between what is and isn’t ruled
out by them—if we are to take the step of turning them into no-go theorems—then we
must consider the context in which they are being discussed.
Normally, there is no need to make the context of discussion explicit, for normally
it is just understood that we are situated in what I will call the “theoretical” context.
In this context, the Bell inequalities are taken to inform our theories of the natural
world : they help us answer the question, specifically, of whether there is some deeper
underlying theory of the natural world in relation to which quantum mechanics is only
an approximation. They cannot answer this question all by themselves, however. Any
theory of the natural world must do more than merely satisfy the constraints imposed by
the Bell inequalities. It must, in particular, also be plausible. Thus besides reproducing
the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, it must also be consistent with our other
theories of physics (and if not it will need to provide a convincing reason why those should
be modified), and with the body of our experiential knowledge in general. It is in fact on
the basis of these plausibility constraints, and not on the basis of the Bell inequalities,
that we rule out many of the “loopholes” left open by the Aspect et. al. experiments.21
Thus, on the basis of these plausibility constraints, a local hidden variables theory in
which individual subsystems communicate classically with one another (or with some
“neutral” system), and in which the results of these individual sub-experiments are only
ever finalised once they have all been collated together—however far in the future this
might be from the initial sub-experiments, and no matter what has happened to Alice
and Bob in the time between—is not only implausible, it is completely absurd.
The theoretical context is not the only context in which the Bell inequalities are
relevant, however. There is also what I will call the purely conceptual context. In this
context the Bell inequalities are taken to inform us as to what is logically possible and
still consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. In this context there really
are no, or at any rate no fixed, plausibility constraints on alternative theories. This is
the realm of the “toy theory.” And yet this is still a useful context of inquiry. It is
useful, in particular, for making conceptual distinctions. Thus Maudlin’s (2011, 89-90)
criticism of Howard’s claim that outcome independence implies separability, for instance,
20It is true that we must appeal to a particular quantum state in order to show that it is violated in
some sense by quantum mechanics. But in and of itself it expresses only a general constraint that must
be satisfied by factorisable probability distributions of a certain kind.
21Kent, for example, provides a number of strong (though for him, not conclusive) plausibility consid-
erations of just this kind for ruling out his own “collapse locality loophole” (Kent, 2005, 6).
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utilises a toy theory of this sort.22 To criticise Maudlin on account of the toy theory’s
physical implausibility (see, e.g., Berkovitz 2008, n. 33 for a criticism of this kind), then,
is to miss the point. The purpose of Maudlin’s toy theory is not to give a physically
plausible separable model for outcome dependence, but rather to demonstrate that there
is a conceptual distinction to be made between outcome independence and separability.
The context that is most appropriate to a discussion of the respective characteristics of
quantum and classical computers is neither the theoretical context, which is too narrow,
nor the purely conceptual context, which is too broad. But there is yet a third context
which the Bell inequalities are relevant to, which is distinct from both the theoretical and
purely conceptual contexts described above. I will call this the practical context. In the
practical context we are concerned with what we are capable of doing with the aim of
classically reproducing the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In this context
we are concerned, that is, with the classical physical systems that are possible for us to
build with the aim of reproducing these statistics.
Now clearly, it is completely irrelevant in this context whether our description of such
a system (which may or may not be characterisable as a “computer” in Turing’s sense)
constitutes a viable alternative theory of the natural world. And yet unlike the purely
conceptual context there is a set of fixed plausibility constraints applicable here. What
are these? Well for one, if the system is to be classical, then it must be characterisable
in accord with the laws and principles of classical physics. It cannot, therefore, include
any form of superluminal communication. But further: we are finite beings, with only
finite resources at our disposal. The complexity involved in the specification of such a
system must therefore be tractable. We will thus rule out any system which uses an
infinite number of additional resources, or even only an amount that is exponential with
respect to the number of systems, as implausible in this context. Local hidden variables
descriptions which utilise only very limited additional resources, on the other hand, will
be perfectly plausible.23
The context most appropriate to a discussion of the respective properties of quantum
and classical computers is obviously the practical, not the theoretical or purely conceptual
contexts; for quantum and classical computers are physical systems buildable by us. The
local hidden variables description depicted in Figure 1, therefore, is a plausible local
hidden variables theory of just this, i.e. of the practical, kind.
Before moving on, let me discuss an issue regarding the distinctions that I am making
which may have begun to worry the informed reader. Earlier (§3), during our discussion
of local hidden variables descriptions of bipartite entangled states (i.e., the Bell states
and other entangled bipartite combinations of Pauli eigenstates), we saw that it was pos-
sible to provide a local hidden variables description to reproduce the statistics associated
22In the (nonlocal) model, two identical particles, equipped with some means of superluminal com-
munication (a tachyon, for instance), interact and then are sent in the direction of two detectors at
spacelike separation from one another. Each particle is equipped with an identical set of instructions:
on approaching a detector, if no message has been received, the particle is to effectively flip a fair coin to
determine whether or not to pass through, after which it is to transmit a message (e.g., via the tachyon)
specifying the setting of its detector and the outcome of the experiment (i.e., whether or not it passed
through). Upon receiving this message, the other particle is to agree with the outcome specified in the
message with a probability calculated on the basis of the difference between the setting of its detector
and the detector setting specified in the message it has received.
23I am taking “tractable” here in a relative sense. That is, the resources required by a classical
computer to reproduce a particular effect should differ tractably from those required by a quantum
computer. Or in other words: it should not be essentially harder for the classical system to produce the
same effect as the quantum system.
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with Pauli measurements on systems in such states, and moreover without utilising any
amount of communication. But in fact it is possible, if we allow the parties to exchange a
single classical bit, to provide what I have been calling a practical local hidden variables
description of the statistics for these states—not only for Pauli measurements—but for
any combined projective measurement on the system (see Appendix A.2). Given this, the
reader may wonder whether the practical context really rules out anything as implausible;
i.e., whether there are any meaningful distinctions between local and nonlocal theories
to be made in that context.
Indeed, if it were the case that the statistics associated with all quantum mechanical
measurements—regardless of the state and the number of systems they were performed
upon—could be accounted for by a local hidden variables description of this kind, then
truly nothing would be ruled out as implausible in this context. But that would never-
theless be a very meaningful claim. It would mean, precisely, that it is both possible and
plausible for us to build classical physical systems to reproduce every observable quantum
mechanical effect. Surely this would be of enormous interest. This is not the case, of
course. But in the same way, it is certainly both highly meaningful and of great interest
to say that it is both possible and plausible for us to build classical physical systems to
reproduce all of the observable behaviour of systems in the Bell states.
At any rate it is actually not very surprising (in hindsight) that the statistics asso-
ciated with arbitrary projective measurements on bipartite entangled systems are recov-
erable using only a small amount of additional resources. Both Jozsa & Linden (2003)
and Abbott (2012) have shown,24 by independent means, that one requires multi -partite
entanglement (i.e., a number of parties n ≥ 3) for a quantum computer to realise a com-
putational advantage over a classical computer. All three of these results, therefore, are
mutually supporting. But importantly, regarding the multi-partite case: while there are
strong indications (see Tessier, 2004) that the number of classical bits required to model
the quantum mechanical predictions associated with arbitrary projective measurements
is unbounded, the number of bits required to classically reproduce the statistics asso-
ciated with Pauli measurements is only linear in the number of systems. Thus we can
plausibly build—i.e., produce local hidden variables descriptions of—classical systems
to model the statistics associated with the Gottesman-Knill operations for an arbitrary
number of quantum systems. But we cannot plausibly do so for arbitrary operations and
measurements.
Of course, in the theoretical context, even one bit of classical communication would be
completely implausible. Indeed I will venture to say that we would never take seriously
any theory involving communication of this kind which purports to be a theory of the
natural world. But when we are discussing the differences between classical and quantum
computers, we are situated not in the theoretical but in the practical context: we are
discussing the kinds of things that we can do and the kinds of systems that we can build.
5 The sufficiency of entanglement thesis
Let us review the ground we have covered so far. Recall that according to the Gottesman-
Knill theorem, there is a certain set of quantum operations which, despite the fact that
they are capable of generating entangled states, are efficiently simulable on a classical
24For Jozsa & Linden, of course, the proof is only taken as valid in the context of the amplitude
formalism.
13
computer. And recall that based on this, it has been claimed that entanglement is not,
therefore, sufficient to enable one to achieve a quantum speedup. Now we saw (§3) that
to say of a quantum system that it is “simulable by a classical computer,” is essentially
to say that it is possible to give it an alternative description in terms of local hidden
variables, in a sense that we clarified in §4. Thus the Gottesman-Knill theorem entails
the following: there are some statistics associated with entangled states that admit of a
local hidden variables description.
We already knew this, however, and contrary to Jozsa & Linden (2003), we did not
have to refer to the stabiliser formalism to learn it. For Bell’s and related inequalities
inform us of the general constraints that a locally causal description of a joint probability
distribution must satisfy. And in some cases (i.e., for some measurements), as we already
knew, the predictions associated with such descriptions are compatible with the quantum
mechanical ones. Moreover, we did not need the Gottesman-Knill theorem to tell us that,
as we saw in §4, the local hidden variables descriptions compatible with the statistics of
Pauli measurements are such that we would consider them plausible in the context of a
discussion of classical physical machines that we can build. Finally, as I will elaborate
upon shortly, we already know, and do not need the Gottesman-Knill theorem to tell us,
that this particular set of quantum operations is minuscule as compared to the set of all
operations performable on such quantum systems.
It is possible to characterise the distinction between classical and quantum mechanical
systems as follows. Whereas the nature of quantum mechanical systems is such that they
allow us to efficiently exploit the full representational capacity of Hilbert space,25 this
is not so for classical systems (see Ekert & Jozsa, 1998). The state space of an n-
fold quantum system that is efficiently simulable classically is only a tiny portion of the
system’s overall state space. The reason for the larger size of the quantum state space (2n
dimensions for n qubits), however, is the possibility of entangled systems. It is because
composite classical systems must always be representable as product states that their
state space is smaller (2n dimensions for n bits). If we have an n-fold entangled quantum
system, therefore, it follows straightforwardly that the evolution of such a system cannot,
in general, be efficiently simulated classically.26 It is nevertheless possible, of course, to
utilise only a small portion of the state space of a quantum mechanical system—exactly
that portion of the state space which is accessible efficiently by a similarly sized classical
system—but this has no bearing on the nature of the actual physical resources that are
provided by the quantum system. Analogously, a life vest may be said to be sufficient to
keep me afloat on liquid water. I must actually wear it if it is to perform this function,
of course; but that is not a fact about this piece of equipment’s capabilities, only about
my choice of whether to use it or not.
It is therefore misleading, I believe, to conclude on the basis of the Gottesman-Knill
theorem, that entanglement is not a sufficient resource to enable quantum computational
speedup. What the Gottesman-Knill theorem shows us–something we should already
know—is that simply having a system in an entangled state is not enough to give one
a quantum speedup. One must also use such a system to its full potential; i.e., one
must not limit oneself to only a minuscule proportion of the operations allowable on such
systems. Obviously, entanglement is insufficient in this, somewhat trivial, sense. But if
one intends (as Jozsa & Linden clearly do) by the claim that entanglement is insufficient—
25Duwell (2004, Ch. 8) calls this feature ‘well-adaptedness’.
26I say ‘efficiently’ because it is always possible, of course, to simulate quantum evolution if one allows
for an exponential slowdown.
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something very different—that further physical resources are required to enable speedup,
then I submit that this has not been shown by the Gottesman-Knill theorem.27 Far from
being a problem for the view that entanglement is a sufficient resource to enable quantum
speedup, in fact, the Gottesman-Knill theorem serves to highlight the role that is actually
played by entanglement in the quantum computer and to clarify exactly why and in what
sense it is sufficient to preclude the computer’s evolution from plausibly being classically
simulated.28
6 Summary
I began by introducing the Gottesman-Knill theorem with a view to motivating the asser-
tion that the sufficiency of entanglement thesis is false in some sense, and then considered
a detailed statement of this assertion due to Jozsa & Linden (2003). I subsequently clar-
ified what I argued to be the real lesson of the Gottesman-Knill theorem: that there
some statistics associated with entangled states which admit of a local hidden variables
description. I then considered the consequences of this for our understanding of the suf-
ficiency of entanglement thesis. I concluded that the Gottesman-Knill theorem does not
show that the sufficiency of entanglement thesis, interpreted as a claim regarding the
resources required to enable quantum speedup, is false.
A Recovering statistics for bipartite entangled states
generated from Gottesman-Knill operations
A.1 No communication
Recall that the Gottesman-Knill operations consist of the Clifford group of transfor-
mations (possibly conditioned on classical bits) which map the Pauli group into itself,
measurements of observables in the Pauli group, and state preparation in the computa-
tional basis. Consider, to start with, state preparation. By hypothesis, each qubit will
initially be prepared in one of the states |0〉 or |1〉. These states are stabilised by Z and
−Z respectively; i.e., each qubit will begin in a state equivalent to either Z|0〉 or −Z|1〉.
The Pauli gates X, Y , and Z (I is just the trivial transformation) represent pi rotations
of the Bloch sphere about the x, y, and z axes respectively. Applied to Z they yield:
XZX† = −Z, Y ZY † = −Z, ZZZ† = Z. Applied to X and Y they yield: XXX† = X,
27Note that my characterisation of entanglement as a physical resource is not motivated only by the
conceptual arguments I have just given. To cite but one of many examples, one can show (Masanes,
2006) that for any non-separable state ρ, some other state σ is capable of having its teleportation fidelity
(see Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §9.2.2) enhanced by ρ’s presence. It is also possible to quantify the amount
of entanglement contained in a given state by means of so-called entanglement measures, the theory of
which is surveyed in Plenio & Virmani (2007). Conceptual considerations aside, these uses legitimate, in
this author’s mind, the characterisation of entanglement as a physical resource. I thank Jeffrey Barrett
for raising this issue.
28What if the waves are rough? It may be that in this case my life vest will not be sufficient to save
me. Analogously, in the presence of noise, as noted by Linden & Popescu (2001), entanglement may not
be sufficient to enable one to achieve exponential quantum speedup. Nevertheless, even in rough weather
I will at least have a better chance of surviving with my life vest on than I will without it. Likewise, even
in the presence of noise, it seems likely that a system in an entangled quantum state will be sufficient
to enable some (though perhaps only a sub-exponential) quantum speedup. For further discussion, see
Cuffaro (2013).
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Y XY † = −X, ZXZ† = −X, XYX† = −Y , Y Y Y † = Y , ZY Z† = −Y . The Hadamard
gate is a pi/2-rotation about the y-axis, followed by a pi-rotation about x. Applied to X,
Y , and Z it yields HXH† = Z, HYH† = −Y , and HZH† = X. The Phase gate (R) is
a pi/2 rotation about the z-axis, with: RXR† = Y , RY R† = X, RZR† = Z. The CNOT
gate is a two qubit gate but its result is either an X or I transformation applied to the
target qubit.
If we now also take account of the way each of these operations transform the system
(i.e., H|0〉 = |+〉, R|+〉 = |y+〉, and so on), then it is easy to verify that the combined
effect of any of these operations, for any subsystem of the system, must be equivalent
to the measurement of one of the Pauli observables ±X, ±Y , ±Z on an eigenstate of
a Pauli observable. The reader can easily verify that this fact continues to hold if we
also include the generalisations of the Pauli operators ±iX, ±iY , and ±iZ among our
allowed operations. Thus this fact holds true for all of the Gottesman-Knill operations.
One of the states generable from the Gottesman-Knill operations (2.8) is the singlet
state. Expectation values for the results of joint Pauli measurements on this state are:
〈X ⊗ X〉 = 〈Y ⊗ Y 〉 = 〈Z ⊗ Z〉 = −1, with the expectation value for all other joint
measurements (of Pauli observables) = 0. A local hidden variables theory to recover
these (and only these) statistics was given by Bell (2004 [1964]):29
Aλˆ(mˆ) = sign(mˆ · λˆ),
Bλˆ(nˆ) = sign(nˆ · T (λˆ)).
Here, λˆ is a local hidden variable, in the form of a unit vector, taken on by both systems
at the time of state preparation. mˆ and nˆ are the measurement angles associated with
Alice’s and Bob’s experimental devices, respectively. Aλˆ(mˆ), Bλˆ(nˆ) ∈ {±1} represent
the results, given λˆ, of spin experiments on Alice’s and Bob’s subsystems. The function
sign(α) = 1 if α > 0 or -1 if α < 0. Note that in Cartesian coordinates:
xˆ =
[
1
0
0
]
, yˆ =
[
0
1
0
]
, zˆ =
[
0
0
1
]
, λˆ =
[
cos θ sinφ
sin θ sinφ
cosφ
]
,
where θ is the angle λˆ makes with the x-axis in the x−y plane and φ is the angle λˆ makes
with the z-axis in the z − x plane. Finally, T is a transformation (some combination of
rotations and reflections) such that
T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[ −x
−y
−z
]
.
Local hidden variables theories for Pauli measurement statistics on the other Bell
states, as well as on other bipartite entangled combinations of Pauli eigenstates, can be
obtained by varying T (see Figure 2).
A.2 Communication
The following protocol is capable of reproducing the statistics associated with arbitrary
projections on spin-1/2 systems in the singlet state (Toner & Bacon, 2003). Two inde-
pendently chosen random unit vectors, λˆ1 and λˆ2, are shared by Alice and Bob at state
preparation. Upon measuring her particle along the direction mˆ, Alice outputs the result
A = −sign(mˆ·λˆ1). She then sends a single classical bit c = sign(mˆ·λˆ1)×sign(mˆ·λˆ2) = ±1
to Bob. Bob, who measures along nˆ, then outputs the result B = sign[nˆ · (λˆ1 + cλˆ2)].
29In Bell’s original (equivalent) version, Bλˆ(nˆ) = −sign(nˆ · λˆ). The reason for my modified presentation
will become evident shortly.
16
State Pauli Exp. values Transf.
|Φ+〉 〈X ⊗X〉 = 〈Z ⊗ Z〉 = 1, 〈Y ⊗ Y 〉 = −1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[
x−y
z
]
|Φ−〉 〈Y ⊗ Y 〉 = 〈Z ⊗ Z〉 = 1, 〈X ⊗X〉 = −1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[−x
y
z
]
|Ψ+〉 〈X ⊗X〉 = 〈Y ⊗ Y 〉 = 1, 〈Z ⊗ Z〉 = −1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[ x
y
−z
]
|0,−〉−|1,+〉√
2
〈X ⊗ Z〉 = 〈Z ⊗X〉 = −1, 〈Y ⊗ Y 〉 = 1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[ −z
y
−x
]
|0,y−〉−|1,y+〉√
2
〈X ⊗ Z〉 = 〈Y ⊗X〉 = 〈Z ⊗ Y 〉 = −1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[−y
−z
−x
]
|+,y+〉+|−,y−〉√
2
〈X ⊗ Y 〉 = 〈Y ⊗X〉 = 〈Z ⊗ Z〉 = 1 T
[
x
y
z
]
=
[
y
x
z
]
etc.
Figure 2: Examples of local hidden variables theories for bipartite entangled combinations of
Pauli eigenstates. Expectation values for joint measurements of Pauli observables not indicated
above are all = 0.
B Recovering statistics of Pauli measurements on
the GHZ state
Below I sketch a procedure for consistently recovering the statistics of Pauli observables
on a tripartite GHZ state. For a more rigorous treatment of this case, and for a treatment
of n-partite GHZ states and other states generable from Gottesman-Knill operations, see
Tessier (2004).
Consider three spatially separated spin-1/2 systems, a, b, c, which, having previously
interacted, are now in the GHZ state:30
1√
2
(|0〉a|0〉b|0〉c + |1〉a|1〉b|1〉c). (B.1)
It can be shown (see Mermin, 1990) that any local hidden variables theory (in which the
parties are not allowed to communicate) which attempts to assign noncontextual values
to the x and y components of each particle’s spin in this state will predict that:
v(Xa ⊗Xb ⊗Xc) = v(Xa ⊗ Ib ⊗ Ic) · v(Ia ⊗Xb ⊗ Ic) · v(Ia ⊗ Ib ⊗Xc) = −1,
where v(M) is the result of measuring the observable M . This contradicts the quantum
mechanical prediction of:
v(Xa ⊗Xb ⊗Xc) = 1.
The following is a scheme for reproducing the statistics of the GHZ state:
X
Y
Z
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
qA qB qC
R2R3 R2 R3
iR1R2R3 iR1R2 iR1R3
R1 R1 R1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(B.2)
30The label “GHZ” actually refers not just to this but to the family of states: 1√
2
(|0〉⊗n ± |1〉⊗n).
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|000〉 :
X
Y
Z
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
qA qB qC
R1 R2 R3
−iR1 iR2 iR3
1 1 1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
HA−−→
X
Y
Z
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
qA qB qC
1 R2 R3
iR1 iR2 iR3
R1 1 1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
CNOTAB−−−−−−−−→
X
Y
Z
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
qA qB qC
R2 R2 R3
iR1R2 iR1R2 iR3
R1 R1 1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
CNOTAC−−−−−−−−→
X
Y
Z
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
qA qB qC
R2R3 R2 R3
iR1R2R3 iR1R2 iR1R3
R1 R1 R1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Figure 3: A series of hidden variables tables modelling the preparation of the state GHZ
= (|000〉 + |111〉)/√2 (Tessier, 2004). The update rules for the H and CNOT gates are: H:
Xf = Zi, Y f = −Y i, Zf = Xi. CNOT: Xfs = XisXit , Y fs = Y isXit , Zfs = Zis, Xft = Xit ,
Y ft = Z
i
sY
i
t , Z
f
t = Z
i
sZ
i
t , where P
i is the specification of P before the given transformation and
P f is its new specification. s and t refer to the control and target qubits, respectively, involved
in a given CNOT operation.
Here, qA, qB, and qC are the constituent qubits of the system. X, Y , Z, and I refer to
measurements of Pauli observables. The Rk are random variables which return a value
of ±1 with equal probability. They are to be interpreted epistemically in the sense that
they reflect our limited knowledge of a determinate value of either +1 or −1 that is taken
on by the system at state preparation. Note that this value can only be revealed by
measurement: distinct systems subjected to identical state preparations will in general
have different values for their Rk.
31 To determine the outcome of a particular measure-
ment, we multiply the entries in the lookup table corresponding to the sub-measurements
performed on each qubit, with (Rk)
2 = 1, discarding any lone straggling value of i that
remains after calculating the final result. For example, v(X ⊗X ⊗X) = R2R3R2R3 = 1,
v(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Y ) = R2R3iR1R2iR1R3 = −1, v(Y ⊗ Y ⊗ X) = iR1R2R3iR1R2R3 = −1,
v(X ⊗ Y ⊗ I) = R2R3iR1R2 = ±i⇒ ±1, etc. In Figure 3 hidden variables tables for all
of the intermediate steps from the initial preparation of the tripartite product state |000〉
to the final GHZ state are depicted.
It can be verified that all of the predictions of quantum mechanics for joint Pauli
experiments on the GHZ state are recovered by this scheme. Unfortunately the results of
these experiments cannot be made consistent with one another under the assumption that
each qubit’s x and y spin component is a noncontextual “element of reality” associated
with the system. For instance, the outcome of the joint measurement X ⊗ Y ⊗ Y is
v(X⊗Y ⊗Y ) = R2R3iR1R2iR1R3 = −1. Under the supposition that each qubit possesses
independent values of both spin-x and spin-y, this joint measurement outcome must be
consistent with the product of the outcomes of the individual measurements X ⊗ I ⊗ I,
I ⊗Y ⊗ I, and I ⊗ I ⊗Y . But it is not, for v(X ⊗ I ⊗ I)× v(I ⊗Y ⊗ I)× v(I ⊗ I ⊗Y ) =
(R2R3)(R1R2)(R1R3) = 1.
This can, however, be compensated for. We can ensure consistency by allowing the
parties to signal. For instance, Bob and Alice can agree that he will send her a single
classical bit indicating whether or not he performed a Y measurement on his qubit. Upon
31No such interpretation of the variables Rk is given in either Tessier (2004) or Tessier et al. (2005),
but such an interpretation is implicit if one is to make sense of the claims made therein.
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receipt of this bit, Alice should flip the sign of her local outcome if either she or Bob (or
if both of them) measured Y . Thus for the case above we will have v(X ⊗ I ⊗ I)× v(I ⊗
Y ⊗ I) × v(I ⊗ I ⊗ Y ) = (−R2R3)(R1R2)(R1R3) = −1. This is consistent both with
the value obtained for the joint measurement X ⊗ Y ⊗ Y and with the individual results
for the measurements X ⊗ I ⊗ I, I ⊗ Y ⊗ I, and I ⊗ I ⊗ Y (each of the latter three
produces a random outcome of ±1 with equal probability). In this manner it is possible
to make the outcome of every joint measurement specifiable in the model consistent with
the corresponding product of individual measurement outcomes.
The scheme generalises. For an n-qubit GHZ state, as well as for any state gener-
able using only Gottesman-Knill operations, only n − 2 bits of classical communication
are required to accurately model the statistics associated with measurements of Pauli
observables on the system (details are given in Tessier 2004).
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